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Abstract 
Disability rolls have escalated in developed nations over the last 40 years. The UK, however, stands 
out because the numbers on these benefits stopped rising when a welfare reform was introduced that 
integrated disability benefits with unemployment insurance (UI). This policy reform improved job 
information and sharpened bureaucratic incentives to find jobs for the disabled (relative to those on 
UI). We exploit the fact that policy was rolled-out a quasi-random across geographical areas. In the 
long-run the policy improved the outflows from disability benefits by 6% and had an (insignificant) 
1% increase in unemployment outflows. This is consistent with a model where information helps both 
groups, but bureaucrats were given incentives to shift effort towards helping the disabled find jobs 
and away from helping the unemployed. Interestingly, in the short-run the policy had a negative 
impact for both groups suggesting important disruption effects. The policy passes a dynamic cost-
benefit calculation, but the costs of the organizational disruption implies that benefits take about six 
years to exceed the one-off set-up costs making it unattractive for (myopic) policy-makers. 
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1. Introduction
Disability rolls have risen almost inexorably in the advanced nations over the last forty years (e.g. 
Autor and Duggan, 2003). In the US, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) cash transfers 
have tripled from $40bn in 1979 to $124bn in 2010, and their share of total social security 
payments rose from 10% in 1988 to 20% in 2009 (Autor, 2012). Figure 1 shows that the numbers 
on the equivalent UK scheme, Incapacity Benefit (IB), also rose spectacularly from 400,000 in 
1977 to 2m in 2009 for those of working age.4 Unlike the US, however, the UK increase seemed 
peak in early 2000s and then fall slightly. This coincided with the introduction of a major policy 
reform in 2001 where the agencies responsible for employment services and welfare benefits for 
working age people were merged into one organization, “Jobcentre Plus”. There was an emphasis 
on improving job search assistance and monitoring for IB recipients, something that had already 
been happening for UI claimants since the mid-1980s (e.g. Van Reenen, 2004).  
The welfare reform physically integrated the offices where welfare claimants go to have 
work-focused interviews, collect checks and look for jobs. It simultaneously increased information 
and changed bureaucratic incentives, without changing the financial generosity of the welfare 
system. Information was improved for all groups by a major new IT system and new buildings. 
Incentives for bureaucrats in charge of helping welfare claimants find jobs were changed, via an 
explicit points system that awarded three times as many points for helping a disabled person into 
work than for helping an unemployed person. These points fed into career progression for local 
bureaucrats.  
In our empirical analysis we exploit the staggered roll-out of the Jobcentre Plus policy 
across geographical areas, using quarterly administrative data on over 400 UK districts over a nine 
year period.5 We identify the policy impact by comparing the change in exit rates for disability 
and unemployment benefit claimants in districts treated at a point in time to that in districts treated 
at an earlier or later date. Information on benefit claimants at the district level is provided by the 
Department for Work and Pensions, and we use quarterly series for stocks, inflows and outflows 
for various categories of welfare benefits, disaggregated by age and district, and, for the 
unemployed, also disaggregated by destination (e.g. to employment versus non-participation).  
4 See Banks et al. (2015) for benefit trends in the UK and related reforms. 
5 UK districts are similar to US counties. The average population of a district was 120,000 in the 2001 census. In 
comparison, the average population of a US county is around 100,000 people.  
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We find two main results. First, there were significant organizational disruption costs from 
the policy, with outflows from disability and unemployment benefits initially declining after the 
policy change, and more markedly so for the unemployed than the disabled. Second, in the long-
run there are significant positive effects on disabled outflows, whereas unemployment outflows 
(although also positive) are small and insignificant. These patterns are consistent with a simple 
model whereby bureaucratic efforts to reduce disabled rolls increased, but efforts to reduce 
unemployment rolls decreased. However, overlaid on this there was a long-term positive effect on 
both groups from better information but a short-run negative effect from adjustment costs due to 
organizational disruption. 
Based on our estimates, we provide a simple cost-benefit analysis of Jobcentre Plus that 
indicates positive net benefits from the policy. However, the presence of significant short-run costs 
from disruption and sunk set-up costs highlights why such welfare changes are hard to implement. 
We estimate that it takes about six years for the reform to break even, which is beyond the time 
horizon of most policy-makers.  
This paper links to two main strands of literature. First, the issue of welfare reforms has 
resurfaced following the Great Recession of 2008-2009. For example, increases in unemployment 
were much lower than expected in the UK6 and Germany, and both countries experienced 
significant welfare reforms prior to the crisis. A body of work in the welfare literature has studied 
the effects of financial incentives to benefit recipients on the duration of unemployment (e.g. 
Lalive et al, 2007), while the role of explicit incentives in the provision of job placement services 
has been less of a focus. Another strand of this literature has emphasized the interplay between 
unemployment and disability insurance, as some job losers may turn to disability benefits once 
they are no longer eligible for unemployment benefits. For the UK, Petrongolo (2009) finds that 
welfare recipients subject to stricter job search requirements were more likely to start spells on 
health-related benefits within six months of the end of a claimant unemployment spell, while 
Mueller et al. (2013) find no evidence that expiry of unemployment benefits raised applications 
for disability benefits in the US over the Great Recession. By contrast, our work explores links 
between unemployment and disability insurance stemming from job placement, rather than 
jobseekers’ incentives.    
6 On the UK case see Blundell, Crawford and Jin (2014), Gregg, Machin and Salgado (2014) and Pessoa and Van 
Reenen (2014). 
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Second, a growing literature has highlighted how incentive systems can be used to improve 
efficiency, particularly in the public sector (e.g. on the theory see Besley and Ghatak, 2005; and 
on empirics Meyer, 1995 and Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011, have surveys). Heckman et al. (2011) 
found bureaucrats’ rewards affected cream skimming and showed significant differences between 
short run and long-run programme impacts. We contribute to this literature by emphasizing the 
multitasking aspects in the provision of effort in government organizations.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the institutional framework in 
the UK and the hypotheses we test, in section 3 we outline the data used in the empirical analysis, 
while in section 4 we report the analysis and results of how the treatment impacts inflows into and 
outflows from different benefit categories. In section 5 we examine the robustness of our results 
to different specifications and in section 6 we perform a simple cost-benefit evaluation of Jobcentre 
Plus.  Section 7 concludes. 
2. The Institutional Framework
2.1 The Jobcentre Plus system 
There were major changes in the delivery of public employment and benefit services in the UK 
between 2001 and 2008. The change was part of a wider policy emphasis on Welfare-to-Work 
initiatives7 that sought to increase labour market activity. In March 2000, the Prime Minister 
announced the establishment of the Jobcentre Plus (JCPlus) organization, with the scope to deliver 
an integrated, work-focused service to both employers and benefit claimants of working age in 
UK. The creation of Jobcentre Plus stemmed from the integration of the Employment Service and 
Benefits Agency into one organization, combining benefit advice with job placement services. The 
integration took place in six waves between 2001 and 2008.8 
Two main changes resulted from the introduction of Jobcentre Plus, relating broadly to 
information and incentives. On the information side, the integration of employment services and 
7 The guiding principle of these welfare reforms was “work for those who can and security for those who cannot” 
(Hyde et al., 2002).  
8 Links between benefits and work search in the UK had been introduced with Restart Programme in 1986 (Dolton 
and O'Neill, 1996, 2002) and were deepened with the introduction of the Jobseekers Allowance in 1996, and the New 
Deal for Young People in 1998 (see Manning, 2009, Petrongolo, 2009, Blundell et al, 2004, and Van Reenen, 2004 
for a history of these developments). Mandatory work-focused interviews were in place for JSA recipients since 1996, 
well before the introduction of Jobcentre Plus (see Pointer and Barnes, 1997). 
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welfare checks under one roof was accompanied by a massive investment in improved information 
technology (IT) and organizational restructuring. The average size of an office was increased as 
buildings were combined, re-built, and offices refurbished. Aggregate floor space decreased by 
20% as did the total number of staff, even though operating costs per square meter increased by 
12% because of high quality infrastructure and locations. Overall, the sunk costs of re-organization 
were around £1.8bn (about $2.7bn), but running costs were reduced by £240m per year (National 
Audit Office, 2008).   
The second major change was the introduction of explicit performance targets called Job 
Entry Targets. As opposed to the previous system of national-level targets for the number of 
beneficiaries to place into jobs, under the new regime every benefit officer who helped a benefit 
claimant into a job was awarded a certain number of explicit Job Entry Target points varying by 
the category of the benefit claimant. In addition, there was a district-level target in terms of the 
number of points to achieve each quarter. These performance standards acted like a performance 
benchmark for the managers and mattered for the career prospects of the benefit officers.9 
2.2 Framework 
One can theoretically expect at least three different effects of JCPlus on job placement. Firstly, the 
physical reorganization, installation of new IT systems and estate rationalization caused disruption. 
This would lead to a short-run reduction in the productivity of welfare officers. We expect the 
disruption effect to be broadly similar across all benefit groups (and test this assumption), and to 
decay over time as officers settle into the new system.  
Second, there may a long-run impact of restructuring and modern IT systems on efficiency. 
IT would facilitate various manual tasks such as recording job entries and keeping records of 
beneficiaries. Increased automation of services would improve the speed and accuracy with which 
benefits applications are processed. This reduces operating costs as well as the time officers spend 
9 The UK welfare system had introduced performance benchmarking since the early 1980s (Propper and Wilson 2003; 
Bagaria et al, 2013). They have been designed according to targets embodied in the Public Service Arrangements 
(PSAs) of different government agencies. Makinson (2000) describes the performance standards in the Employment 
Service, The Benefits Agency, HM Customs and Excise and Inland Revenue. These mostly consisted of national-level 
targets for the number of beneficiaries to place into jobs, without explicit rewards at the individual or local level. The 
US welfare system has also introduced elements of performance pay within the recent US Ticket to Work (TTW) 
Program, providing job placement and ongoing employment support to disability insurance recipients. TTW service 
providers become eligible for payments from the Social Security as soon as beneficiaries receive earnings above a 
certain threshold. 
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on these back office functions, and enables them to focus on conducting more client-facing job 
finding interviews. Thus, we expect a long-run increase in job placements for all benefit groups, 
as the provision of welfare services becomes more efficient. Again, this effect should be broadly 
similar across all benefit recipients. 
Thirdly, the introduction of Job Entry Targets implies a shift in bureaucratic incentives in 
favour of Incapacity Benefit (IB, the main disability benefit) claimants at the expense of the 
unemployed claimants. Before the introduction of JCPlus, there were broad national level targets 
for job placements and sub-targets for different benefit categories. For example, in 2001 there was 
a national target to place 1.36m jobless people into work, accompanied by a sub-target to place 
275,000 “disadvantaged” individuals into work.10 With the JCPlus policy explicit award points 
were introduced under the new Job Entry Target system that were designed to reflect prioritizing 
IB claimants. As shown in Table A1, a benefit officer was awarded fifty per cent more points if 
he/she placed a person on Incapacity Benefit11 into a job than a long-term JSA beneficiary, and 
three times more points relative to a short-term JSA beneficiary. Given that the benefit officers 
had to achieve a quarterly target number of points, this incentivized them to focus on placing the 
IB claimants into jobs.  
Consider a multi-tasking model with fixed inputs along the lines of Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1991). Assume that the Jobcentre officers have a given stock of “inputs”. They can apply 
different amounts of this “input” to different individual clients (benefit claimants). These inputs 
affect the outcomes experienced by claimants. In our context, the input variable represents staff 
time for interviews and the direct costs of the services provided. After the introduction of the 
explicit weighting system, we expect them to reallocate their efforts in favour of IB claimants, 
with adverse effects on JSA claimants’ job finding prospects.12  
2.3 Identification 
We exploit the staggered roll-out of JCPlus offices across Local Authority Districts in the UK to 
identify the causal impact of the policy. The switch to JCPlus was phased in over six waves, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. The figure shows the additional districts covered under each wave. The first 
10 This included those with disabilities, participants in New Deal for Lone Parents, partners of continuously 
unemployed for 26 weeks, homeless people and qualifying ex-offenders. 
11 We discuss the other main group, Lone Parents (non-working single moms) in Section 6. 
12 Unfortunately, we are not able to measure staff inputs, but we can observe participant outcomes. So, in a sense this 
is a reduced form estimation. 
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wave begun on 1st October 2001 in 32 districts, the second wave began in October 2002 with 27 
more districts, and by the first quarter of 2008, almost 100% of the country was covered. Figure 3 
presents a map of the policy roll out, showing no obvious patterns of geographic clusters that 
adopted the policy at the same time.  
We consider treatment as the “go live” quarter for a district. To address concerns that 
districts were not randomly assigned into treatment, in Section 4 we check for differences in pre-
trends between the treated and non-treated for various benefit categories.  
There are multiple offices in a district (between 32 and 171), and we also considered 
exploiting within-district variation from the policy diffusion across offices. However, we found 
that although observables could not predict which districts were treated, there did appear to be a 
systematic component of which offices within a district were treated. For example, it is likely that 
a district treated the offices with a higher benefit outflow rate to begin first (Table A2). 13  Further, 
the points system was formally set at the district level, so this seems a natural level of 
disaggregation.  
We use a difference-in-differences framework to identify the causal impact of JCPlus. 
Since all districts are treated eventually, effectively we are comparing districts which are treated 
in a particular year and quarter to those who are treated at a later stage. Our main outcomes are the 
number of exits from disability and unemployment benefits in each quarter in each district. Since 
we also control for the lagged stock of claimants, the regressions can be considered as welfare 
outflow equations. 
One potential concern is that jobseekers may be manipulating the benefit category that they 
apply to, thus affecting the composition of the claimant stock in each clients’ group and the 
corresponding outflow rate from benefits. For instance, benefit applicants may have an incentive 
to enter the caseload under the IB rules rather than under JSA rules. However, being classified as 
eligible for IB requires a medical certificate, and conditions required to qualify have been made 
stricter over time,14 leaving limited leeway as to what kind of benefits one would be eligible for. 
13 National Audit Office (2008) states that “Whilst an overall vision of the service improvements was successfully 
communicated from the centre, the detailed planning of the roll-out was delegated to the districts…. Implementation 
of Jobcentre Plus was a locally driven process” and that “Localised planning allowed Jobcentre Plus to make early 
progress with the roll-out, as the districts which were ready first could be scheduled for early roll-out”. 
14 For instance, in 1999, the Welfare Reform and Pensions Bill introduced ‘continuing assessment of possibility of 
returning to work’ (Burchardt, 1999). While the criteria for benefit receipt remained unaltered, the significant change 
was the collection of additional information focussing on the abilities of the claimant at intervals and the allocation of 
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A related concern is that the introduction of JCPlus may affect jobseekers’ decisions whether to 
sign-on at all for benefits. To examine these concerns further, we also analyse the impact of JCPlus 
on the inflows into different benefit categories in Section 4.  
3. Data
We use administrative data provided by the UK Department of Work and Pensions, covering the 
whole population on welfare. The JSA database contains monthly information from June 1983 on 
the stocks, inflows and outflows of unemployment benefits’ recipients. The data is available at the 
Local Authority District level across Great Britain, with 406 districts.15 We further disaggregate 
claimants by age groups, 18-24 year olds, and 25-59 year olds.16  
The second dataset contains quarterly data from 1999Q3 at the district level on other welfare 
benefits, among which the key disability benefit is IB. To be consistent across the two datasets, 
we aggregate the monthly JSA data at the quarterly level, but use monthly information as a 
robustness check. We estimate all our specifications on a consistent time period of nine years, from 
1999Q3 to 2008Q2, the quarter before the collapse of Lehman’s, which triggered the Great 
Recession and a huge upsurge of unemployment.  
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Columns (1) and (2) refer to national 
aggregates per quarter, and columns (3) and (4) refer to (unweighted) averages across districts, age 
groups and quarters. The aggregate outflow rate from JSA is about 70% per quarter, and the gross 
outflow is slightly higher than the gross inflow, as unemployment was falling over the sample 
period. Outflow rates from IB are much lower at nearly 3% per quarter. As expected, far fewer 
people leave the stock of disability rolls than unemployment. 
a personal adviser to oversee each claim. New claimants were also required to attend an interview at the beginning of 
the claim, and any time thereafter, to discuss possibilities for returning to work. More recently, applicants to IB will 
have to go to a Work Capability Assessment during the first 13 weeks of IB. This was aimed to see if the illness or 
disability affected the claimant’s ability to work.  
15 Local government in England operates under either a single-tier system of unitary authorities and London boroughs, 
or a two-tier system of counties and district councils. The spatial units in our analysis include the unitary authorities, 
London boroughs and districts within counties. There are 352 such units in England. Local government in Scotland is 
organized through 32 unitary authorities. Since 1 April 1996, local government in Wales is organized through 22 
single-tier principal areas. The Scottish and Welsh unit areas are also included in our sample. 
16 We also examine other age splits as robustness checks (Table A6). 
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3.1. Jobcentre Plus and Benefit Flows 
We estimate benefit outflow equations in a difference-in-differences framework. We first estimate 
a static model to estimate the average effect over time arising from JCPlus introduction. The 
specification is:  ln𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 = 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐵𝐵 ln𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1𝐵𝐵 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐵𝐵 ln𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1𝐵𝐵 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵  ,     (1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵  is the number of people in age group a leaving the benefit register B (JSA or IB) in 
district i at time t (quarter). 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 denotes a treatment dummy which turns on in the quarter when the 
first office in district i is treated. The coefficient is identified by the fact that the policy was rolled 
out in six waves with different districts being treated in each wave. One robustness test we consider 
is to allow 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵 being different in each wave and showing that the effect looks remarkably similar 
across waves when the post-wave window is kept fixed. As noted above, we found that the timing 
of when a district was treated appeared to be unrelated to observables. 
We include as controls the stock of claimants of benefit B at the end of the previous quarter 
for the own age group, 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1𝐵𝐵 , as well as for the other age group, 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1𝐵𝐵  (old/young respectively). 
Our preferred specifications include a full set of fixed effects (district by age) and age by time 
dummies, but we also show more restrictive specifications just including separate district, age and 
time effects. We cluster the standard errors at the district level, which is the level at which the 
policy is defined, but results are robust to alternative ways of dealing with spatial autocorrelation 
(e.g. Conley, 1999). 
In equation (1) the treatment effect is summarized by the coefficient 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵, which is an 
average over all the post-treatment quarters. The presence of adjustment costs, however, suggests 
that there should be a distinct dynamic pattern of change with the positive policy effects being 
dampened at first by organizational disruption. Hence, we allow the policy effect to be different 
depending on how many quarters have elapsed since the policy. ln𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝜏𝜏𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜏𝜏7𝜏𝜏=1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐵𝐵 ln𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1𝐵𝐵 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐵𝐵 ln𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1𝐵𝐵 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵  .  (2) 
The 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜏𝜏 term is broken down such that 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎1 is the quarter in which the policy is turned on, 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎2 is 
the first quarter after the policy is turned on, and so on. 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 is the “long-run”, defined as 8 quarters 
or more since the policy change. Since the last treatment wave is in 2006Q3, we have at least two 
years of post-policy experience for all districts. While ending the dynamics after two years is 
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somewhat arbitrary, the treatment coefficients seem stable afterwards and we show that the 
qualitative results are robust to alternative dynamic specifications (e.g. Table A4) 
The disruption hypothesis suggests 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵 < 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵 < 𝛽𝛽3𝐵𝐵 and so on, implying that the initial 
negative disruption effects unwind as the new organizational structure settles down. The incentive 
hypothesis suggests that the positive effects on IB should be stronger than on JSA i.e. 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵 > 𝛽𝛽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽. 
4. Results
In this section we present both the average impact of JCPlus on the outflow from benefits, as well 
as its dynamic evolution, and then turn to examining its effect on inflows into benefits.  
4.1. Basic Results on Outflows from benefits 
In column (1) of Table 2 we estimate equation (1) where the dependent variable is the (log of the) 
outflow from unemployment (JSA claimants). Our controls include the stock of unemployed 
claimants at the end of the previous quarter by age group, time (quarter by year), age and district 
dummies. The coefficient on the post-policy dummy is negative and significant, suggesting that a 
treated district, on average, experiences a 1.5% decrease in unemployment outflows. Given an 
average unemployment outflow of about 650,000 per quarter, this implies just under 10,000 more 
people staying on unemployment benefits. This overall impact is consistent with both disruption 
effects and incentives for benefit officers to substitute effort away from the unemployed and 
towards the disabled. As expected, the lagged stock of own age unemployed claimants enters with 
a significant positive coefficient, while the stock of the other age group has a negative impact, 
suggesting job competition effects across age groups. In column (2), we include a full set of fixed 
effects (district by age dummies) and again find a significant negative coefficient on the post-
policy variable. This result remains unchanged when we also include age interacted with time 
effects in column (3). 
We repeat the same specifications in columns (4)-(6) of Table 2 for the (log) outflow from 
IB, and condition on the lagged IB stocks on the right hand side. In column (4) we estimate the 
specification analogous to column (1) and find a positive and weakly significant coefficient the 
post-policy dummy, suggesting a 1.7% increase in total outflows. Given a sample average outflow 
of 56,000 people, this means an additional 1,000 people off the IB register. In column (5), we 
include a full set of fixed effects and in column (6) we include age*time dummies. The treatment 
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effect falls slightly to 1.5%, roughly equal in absolute value to the policy coefficient in the 
unemployment outflow equation.17 
The specifications in Table 2 just looks at the post-policy period as a whole without 
examining the dynamics of the policy effects. To assess short-run effects arising from 
organizational disruption, Table 3 probes the dynamics more carefully, allowing a differential 
effect in each of the quarters after the policy switches on (up to the eighth quarter after 
introduction) as in equation (2).  
Interestingly, the coefficients show a consistent dynamic pattern, being negative in the 
quarter immediately after the policy introduction, but then becoming more positive over time. We 
detect negative impacts on JSA outflows for the first 5 quarters, but these cease to be significant 
by quarters 6 and 7 and actually turn positive for quarter 8 and beyond. This suggests that after 
two years there is a positive effect of 1.2% on outflows due to the policy, although this effect is 
not significantly different from zero. In contrast, for IB outflows, although we find a negative 
effect in the first quarter after the policy is introduced, this turns positive by the second quarter. 
This positive effect gradually becomes larger and more significant, and in the long-run it suggests 
6.1% extra disabled people left the register in the most general specification of column (6). 
These dynamic responses are presented graphically in Figure 4 and highlight our two main 
findings. First, the long-run effect is positive for both forms of welfare, but it is clearly much 
stronger for disability benefits (Panel B) than unemployment benefits (Panel A). Second, there is 
initially a negative effect for both benefits, but this is much stronger for unemployment than 
disability benefits. 
The interpretation of our results is that the more positive long-run effect of the policy on 
disability compared to unemployment is driven by the new incentive system, such that officers 
devote more effort to helping the disabled into new jobs than the unemployed after the policy 
change. Overlaid on this, however, is an initial disruption effect as buildings and new systems bed 
down and a generally positive effect on both groups from improved information. This depresses 
all outflows and is an adjustment cost of the policy. 
An alternative explanation would be that incentives do not matter but somehow the 
information treatment had a disproportionately larger effect on IB claimants than the unemployed. 
17 The results are robust to conditioning on stocks (by age group) of other benefit recipients (i.e. IB and lone parent 
stocks in JSA outflow equations, JSA and lone parent stocks in IB outflow equations). 
10 
It is not obvious why this should be, but we will look at a more refined test of the incentives 
hypothesis involving a third group of welfare recipients (lone parents) where bureaucratic 
incentives are somewhere in-between those for the other two groups. We find results again 
consistent with the incentive hypothesis when looking at outflows from benefits for this third group 
(see Section 6). 
4.2 Pre-policy trends 
A threat to a causal interpretation of our estimates would be the existence of differential pre-policy 
trends. For example, if districts initially selected for treatment were those in which IB outflows 
were already increasing (and/or JSA outflows decreasing), we would estimate a positive 
(respectively, negative) impact of treatment even in the case in which the policy had no real effect. 
To investigate this we look at pre-treatment trends by estimating the following augmented 
specification of equation (1): ln 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐵𝐵 ln𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1𝐵𝐵 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐵𝐵 ln𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1𝐵𝐵 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 .      (3) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (3), ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 , allows for pre-policy trends. 
The results are reported in Table 4. Column (1) replicates our baseline specification for JSA 
outflows (column (3) of Table 2) for comparison. In column (2) we include four pre-treatment lags 
and note that the coefficients on the pre-treatment dummies are jointly insignificant (F-test =1.88). 
We perform the same specifications for IB in columns (3) and (4) and again find no evidence of 
pre-treatment effects. 
Although this is reassuring, one caveat is that the individual dummy for the quarter 
immediately prior to treatment is significant at the 10% level for JSA in column (2). This could be 
due to the fact that our treatment indicator is based on the true “go live” date of Jobcentre Plus and 
there is likely to be some organizational disruption in advance of that date, which could spill into 
the previous quarter.18 This would reduce the benefits of the policy for JSA, but since these are 
insignificantly positive in the long-run anyway, it makes no substantive difference.  
18 National Audit Office (2008) states that “It introduces a radical shift from the former impersonal surroundings of 
the Jobcentre and Social Security offices to a modern retail-style environment and has a major impact on the way in 
which staff interact with customers and hence the quality of service provided.”  
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4.3 Inflow Rates 
Our analysis focuses on the intended Jobcentre Plus outcome to increase the outflow rates from 
benefits, but a possible side effect is that the inflow rate into benefits also changes as a consequence 
of the policy change.  The resulting bias in the estimated policy effect is hard to sign. One would 
expect an upward bias in the estimated effect of the policy on the JSA outflow (and a downward 
bias for the IB outflow) if the dissuaded individuals were less motivated in their job search and 
more weakly attached to the labour force – and vice versa.  
To examine this issue directly we analyse the impact of the Jobcentre Plus on inflows into 
JSA and IB. We estimate a specification similar to equation (1), using the inflow into each benefit 
category as the dependent variable instead of the outflow:  ln(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 ) = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝜏𝜏𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜏𝜏4𝜏𝜏=0 + 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝜌𝜌 ln𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵          (4) 
In the outflow equation we controlled for the stock of existing benefit claimants, and the 
corresponding stock in the inflow equations is the age-specific population (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎). Ideally, as 
inflows (mostly) consist of people flowing from employment to unemployment, one should control 
for local employment on the right-hand side. But in the absence of high-frequency employment 
data at the district level we use the population figures as a proxy.19  
In column (1) of Table 5 we show that, on average, Jobcentre Plus had no significant effect 
on the inflows into JSA. Along similar lines, column (3) shows no evidence of significant average 
effects on inflows into IB benefits. However, when we look at the dynamic impact on inflows in 
columns (2) and (4), we find that the policy had initially a negative and significant impact on 
inflows into both benefits, although these become positive and insignificant in the long-run.  
To address whether this could be a concern for our results because of changing selection, 
we repeat outflow regressions controlling for various lags of the corresponding inflows. The results 
are reported in Table 6, where all specifications include fixed effects for both district*age and 
age*time interactions.20 Columns (1)-(3) refer to JSA outflows. Although the coefficients on the 
inflow variables, whether one or four lags, are positive and significant as one would expect (since 
19 We assign the mid-year population estimate from www.nomisweb.com (taken on the 30th of June each year) to all 
the quarters in the year. Using interpolated quarterly population estimates (from the mid-year estimates) does not 
change our results. 
20 In alternative specifications, we explicitly control for the duration composition of the stock of benefit claimants at 
the end of the previous quarter, and find that the baseline outflow results are robust. 
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more recent welfare recipients are more likely to leave), our main results are robust to their 
inclusion. To see this, in column (3) we report our baseline equation (2) on the same sample as 
column (2), as some observations are lost when we condition on lagged inflows. The long-run 
effects in columns (1) and (2) are almost identical to those in our baseline specification of column 
(3), and the dynamic effects only slightly muted by the inclusion of inflows. Columns (3)-(6) refer 
to IB outflows, and all coefficients measuring the impact of policy are both qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar across specifications. In particular, the long-run positive effect of the policy 
on IB is still significant and only falls slightly from 0.0547 (column (6)) to 0.0503 in column (5). 
Hence, despite some effects on inflows, any change in composition arising from this does not 
appear to substantially affect our results.   
4.4. Outflows to employment vs. other destinations 
The JSA (but not the IB) database allows us to disaggregate outflows into alternative destinations, 
and in particular to look at outflows into work separately from outflows into other states (such as 
different benefits, training, inactivity, etc.) The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7, 
where columns (1) and (2) refer to outflows into work, while columns (3) and (4) refer to other 
destinations. The broad pattern for either destination looks similar to the overall outflow results, 
although the estimated effects appear stronger especially in the short run when looking at outflows 
into work rather than other destinations.  
Negative effects on JSA outflows into both work and non-work can be rationalized if one 
takes into account the “stick” (job search monitoring) and “carrot” (search effort assistance) 
components of the interactions between JSA claimants and dedicated staff at Job Centres. The 
change in the incentive structure implied that JSA claimants would receive less assistance with the 
job search process than before, thus lowering their job finding rates, at least in the short run. But 
insofar as poorer job search assistance also implied less frequent contact with JSA claimants, one 
may expect looser monitoring and fewer transitions off benefits due to sanctions or discouragement 
(see also Manning, 2008, and Petrongolo, 2009, for the effects of monitoring on the time spent on 
JSA benefits). 
Another interesting point to be noted about columns (1) and (3) is that the congestion effect 
stemming from job competition by jobseekers from other age groups is clearly not present in the 
JSA outflow into other destinations, as the other age group could be competing for jobs in the 
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labour market, but not for other destinations. 
Overall, the results in both specifications in Table 7 are comparable to the earlier results 
on total outflow in Table 2. This reinforces the validity of using total outflow as our dependent 
variable to proxy for outflow to work.  
5. Cost-benefit evaluation
For the purpose of our cost-benefit analysis we consider a policy simultaneously introduced 
throughout the country, as the staggered roll-out would not offer much general insight into costs 
and benefits of similar hypothetical policies in other contexts. We conduct two thought 
experiments. First, we assume away the transitional disruption costs and assume that the steady 
state is reached immediately upon JCPlus introduction. This gives an idea of the long-run welfare 
effect of the policy. Second, we explicitly incorporate the dynamic effects estimated in Figure 4 
and illustrate how costs and benefits map out over the transition to the long-run steady state. This 
produces lower benefits because disruption effects cause an initial increase in the welfare rolls. 
With discounting, this will reduce the present value of the policy change because the losses – 
including the initial rise in welfare rolls and set-up costs – are front-loaded, whereas the long-run 
benefits are more heavily discounted.  
Our cost-benefit calculations take into account (i) the savings in administration costs 
implied by the reorganization of the welfare system; (ii) the increase in output implied by the 
impact of the policy on job finding; (iii) the net exchequer savings which enter into welfare through 
a lower deadweight loss taxation (the rest simply being transfers); (iv) the sunk set-up costs. We 
abstract from the leisure gains and losses of those on welfare.  
5.1 Long-run Cost Benefit Analysis 
The results of the steady-state analysis are represented in Table 8. According to audit reports, the 
annual running costs post-policy were £3.3bn (row 1), about £238m lower than pre-policy (row 
3). 
The steady-state impact of Jobcentre Plus on job creation is obtained from the long-run 
estimates reported in columns (3) and (6) of Table 3. Conservatively, we assume that the long-run 
policy impact on unemployment outflows is zero, as although the point estimate is positive (0.012), 
it is insignificantly different from zero. We set the long-term impact on IB exits at 0.061. Using 
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this estimate, we obtain the implied steady-state fall in the IB rate (IB stock over population), 
according to a flow model of IB entry and exit, as shown in Appendix B. Not all of these exits 
would be into employment. Using the Labour Force Survey (LFS) quarterly panel data for 
1998Q2-2002Q2 (pre-policy) we observe that 30% of IB exists are to jobs, while 70% of 
terminations transit into other benefits or out of the labour force. We also find that 71% of the exits 
to jobs are full-time while the rest are part-time. We assume that non-employment exits would be 
to other benefits with cost on average equivalent to IB. This implies that IB spells that do not 
terminate into employment do not contribute to either job creation or to benefit savings. This is a 
conservative estimate of policy benefits, as several IB exits will be to no welfare benefits at all.  
We use wage outcomes as proxies for additional output created, and consider three possible 
cases for individuals finding employment after an IB spell: the national minimum wage, the 
observed mean wage for individuals ending an IB spell in the LFS, and the median wage in the 
overall wage distribution, obtained from the ASHE 1% sample of taxpayers. The middle case 
seems the most realistic but the minimum wage and median wage scenarios provide useful lower 
and upper bounds, respectively. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 8 correspond to the three alternative 
wage outcomes considered. Row 4 reports weekly earnings for each wage outcome, and row 5 
reports the increase in GDP obtained by combining wage levels with job creation resulting from 
IB exits. The overall GDP gains range between £0.5bn and £1.4bn per year.  
Row 6 reports the net gain resulting from a reduced deadweight cost of taxation. This is set 
to 40%21 of the lower net exchequer cost arising from increased tax revenues and lower benefit 
payments. The mean IB payment in 2000 was £74.71 per week. When an IB recipient finds a job, 
this benefit saving is accompanied by a change in the tax revenue that depends on the earnings and 
the household composition of the recipient. We used the IFS TAXBEN22 simulation model to 
approximate these additional taxes and benefits for the 30% of IB exits who found jobs.23 
Combining these elements produces a benefit from a lower deadweight loss between £110m and 
£200m.  
The sum of the three components reported in rows 3, 5 and 6 of Table 8 represents the total 
21 This follows Gruber (2011). 
22 Estimates were provided by Barra Roantree of the Institute for Fiscal Studies using the IFS tax and benefit micro-
simulation model, TAXBEN. 
23 We consider two household types, a single adult and a couple with two dependent children, and obtain the associated 
tax payments. We assume that two thirds of IB exits are represented by single adults, while the remaining third is 
represented by members of couples with two children consistent with our estimates from the LFS 1998Q2-2002Q2. 
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annual welfare impact of the policy in steady state. This implies an annual net benefit between 
£1bn and £2.2bn in 2010 prices (row 8). This benefit needs to be compared to the one-off sunk 
set-up cost of £2.3bn (row 10) as estimated by audit reports. It is clear that the policy covers the 
sunk costs of the programme easily even on conservative assumptions. If we use the 3.5% social 
discount rate used by the UK government (HM Treasury, 2003) our cost-benefit analysis implies 
a net benefit of Jobcentre Plus in excess of £25bn, even under the most conservative assumptions 
(row 11). 
5.2 Cost Benefit Analysis with transitional dynamics 
While the previous calculations ignore the transitional dynamics, we now consider the dynamic 
effects of policy for each quarter since the policy change, using the estimates from columns (3) 
and (6) of Table 3. In this case we cannot impose the steady-assumptions used to compute the 
steady-state rise in the number of jobs, as this would be equivalent to assuming that the JSA and 
the IB rates reach their steady state levels within a quarter. We thus simply obtain the out-of-
steady-state number of jobs created as the predicted change in the benefit outflow in the relevant 
quarter, net of job separations during that quarter. With labour market churning, some of the 
workers who find jobs separate in subsequent quarters. We estimate these flows from the (pre-
policy) LFS panel.24 For individuals who were on JSA and found jobs 2.3% lost them in the next 
quarter, and for IB the figure was 0.5%.25 
The three earnings scenarios, as well as the running costs, are the same as those considered 
for the steady state analysis of Table 8. We maintain all other assumptions on job finding rates for 
IB recipients, and, for JSA recipients, we compute on the LFS that 70% of exits were to jobs.26  
The evolution of costs and benefits over time is represented in Figure 7. The flat, solid line 
represents the set-up costs, while the three dashed lines represent cumulative benefits since the 
quarter in which the policy turns on, for the three different levels of earnings. Regardless of the 
earnings assumptions, flow social benefits eventually exceed the costs so although incorporating 
dynamics substantially dampens down the net benefits (by almost an order of magnitude), it does 
24 The job separation rate is obtained as the ratio of inflows into IB (JSA) to the employed population of working age. 
25 These quantitative results are very similar to an analytical approximation of the change in employment rates during 
the transition to a new steady state (see Appendix B2).  
26 For the benefit and tax simulation we assume that 70% of JSA exits who find jobs live alone, while 30% live in a 
couple with two children. For IB, about 67% of those who find jobs live alone, while 33% live in a couple with two 
children. 
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not reverse the earlier positive assessment of the program. The present value of the net benefit of 
the reform is about £2.5-3.8bn which outweighs the £2.3bn sunk cost. 
It is worth noting that in the baseline case (middle dashed line in Figure 7), it takes about 
six years after policy introduction for net benefits to exceed set-up costs. This is mainly because 
of declines in unemployment outflows during the first two years of the new regime. Only after six 
years are job entry gains sufficient to compensate both the initial job entry losses and the set-up 
cost. Therefore, although this is a policy which clearly passes the cost-benefit test, a policy maker 
will not cover the costs of introduction for six years. Constitutionally, UK general elections have 
to be held at least once every five years and the average tenure of a minister is usually only two 
years. Thus a politician’s discount rate would be much higher than the social discount rate, 
implying systematic under-investment (see e.g. Aghion et al, 2013). This is why major changes to 
welfare systems like this are so rare. 
6. Robustness and Extensions
6.1 Disaggregating the treatment effect by wave 
The policy roll out was introduced in six waves across the country, and our baseline estimates 
exploit variation from each wave for identification. An important issue is whether the effect of 
treatment is heterogeneous across different waves, and in particular a legitimate worry could be 
that the dynamic effects that we identify may be instead due to averaging over heterogeneous 
effects in earlier and later waves. 
To investigate this we estimated equation (1) separately for each wave of the policy roll-
out. In order to avoid conflating the dynamics with wave effects we keep a fixed post-treatment 
window of one year. The results are reported in Table 9. Although the standard errors are larger as 
the number of observations is substantially reduced, the estimated treatment effect is remarkably 
stable across the different waves. Panel A refers to JSA outflows. Compared to the pooled effect 
we reported in Table 2 of -0.015, wave-specific estimates range from -0.10 (wave 5) to -0.20 (wave 
1), which is a reasonably tight bound. IB estimates in Panel B are generally higher (a range of 
0.011 to 0.32) than the pooled estimate of 0.015, suggesting, if anything, that we might be 
underestimating the positive effect of the programme using the parsimonious specification of 
equation (1). 
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We also considered alternative specifications such as restricting the comparison areas to 
those that had not been treated (Table A3), which lead to similar results. 
6.2 Lone Parents’ Benefits 
Besides JSA and IB, lone parents (overwhelmingly single mothers) on income support are the third 
large category on welfare rolls. Table A1 shows that the points awarded to helping a lone parent 
into work are the same as for IB. Hence one may expect to see this group responding in similar 
ways to the policy as the IB group. However, the lone parents group was not subject to the same 
pressures to look for jobs as the other two groups, implying a weaker expected policy treatment. 
There were also a raft of other policies aimed at lone parents during the same time period, including 
a large increase in the generosity of in-work benefits (similar to EITC) and a voluntary job 
assistance programme (“New Deal for Lone Parents”). These changes may contaminate our tests. 
In column (1) of Table 10 we estimate equation (1) for welfare outflows for lone parents 
and obtain an average decrease of about 1.3% after the policy, only slightly below the 1.5% for 
IB. However, when testing for the presence of pre-trends in column (2) based on the analogue of 
equation (3), we find that the joint F-test rejects the hypothesis of no pre-policy trends (F=3.894), 
whereas we did not find evidence of differential pre-treatment trends for the unemployed or 
disabled (Table 4). We attempt to control for these pre-trends by including district-specific trends 
in column (3) and the joint F-test for pre-trends is now insignificant. Similar to the unemployment 
and disability results, however, we do find a negative effect one quarter before treatment, 
consistent with the impact of organizational restructuring which impedes service delivery even 
before the true “go live” date. When pre-treatment dummies are dropped in column (4), the 
coefficient on the policy variable is -0.01 and insignificant. This value falls about half way between 
the IB and JSA effects. In column (5) we estimate a dynamic specification, and find an initial 
negative impact, which becomes positive by quarter 6 and is significantly positive in the long run. 
The long-run effect of 2.5% is smaller than the long-run IB effect of 6.1% but larger than the JSA 
effect of 1.2% (Figure 8).  
Overall, the treatment effects on lone parents appear to lie between the effects of JSA and 
IB. Just like the other benefits there appears to be an initial negative effect which we interpret as 
an organizational disruption effect. However, in the long-run there is a positive improvement 
consistent with an improvement in incentives.   
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6.3. Spillover Effects 
One potential concern is that, in common with standard difference in difference approaches, we 
do not look at the general equilibrium effects of the policy. For example, Crépon et al. (2013) find 
that there can be unintended negative externalities of active labour market policies as the higher 
outflows from one benefit group take jobs at the expense of others, especially in depressed labour 
markets. We examine this idea by looking at outflows in neighbours to treated districts using an 
augmented for of equation (1): ln𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 = 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜇𝜇𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐵𝐵 ln𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1𝐵𝐵 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐵𝐵 ln𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1𝐵𝐵 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 .  (5) 
We capture spillovers using a dummy (NBR) that is unity in the quarter when a district’s 
neighbours are treated and zero otherwise. The associated effect is captured by the parameter 𝜇𝜇𝐵𝐵 
and is identified by the fact that different districts had their first neighbour treated in different 
quarters. We define neighbouring districts as those with centroids within 10 km of the centroid of 
the main district.  
The results are shown in Table 11. The sample is now smaller for two reasons. First, 
estimates are now based on the first five waves only, since all neighbours are treated by the sixth 
wave. Second, some districts have neighbours whose centroid is further away than 10 km. The 
baseline impacts on JSA and IB hold true even in this sample as seen in columns (1) and (3). In 
column (2), the coefficient on 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is positive, consistent with spillovers as the unemployed find 
it easier to get jobs due to lower JSA outflows in the treated areas. The coefficient is statistically 
insignificant, however. Similarly, in column (4), the coefficient on  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is positive but 
insignificant.  
We investigated a range of alternative specifications, using other bandwidths for defining 
neighbours, including the proportion of treated neighbours rather than a discrete dummy for any 
neighbour treated, weighting by distance, interacting the policy and spillover effects with measures 
of labor market tightness (using vacancy rates), and interacting the policy effects with lagged 
stocks of benefit claimants. In no case could we find evidence that the policy had significant effects 
on other groups.  
6.4 Other Robustness Tests  
We have subjected our results to several other robustness tests, some of which we note here. 
Other programmes. A concern with our design is that our estimated treatment effects may 
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be potentially confounded by other policies implemented at the same time. The only other 
important policy targeted at IB claimants we could find was the “Pathways to Work” programme, 
which aimed to help claimants better understand and manage their health conditions and thereby 
improve their work prospects. It was originally introduced in October 2003 in eight pilot areas, 
and rolled-out to 14 expansion areas from October 2005.27 When including post-treatment 
dummies for the areas affected our baseline estimates are virtually unchanged. For example, using 
the specification of columns (3) and (6) in Table 2, the estimated long-term impact of JCPlus on 
JSA outflows changes from a coefficient (standard error ) of -0.0152 (0.0055) to -0.0147 (0.055), 
and the estimated long-term impact on IB outflows goes from 0.0151 (0.0089) to 0.0149 (0.0087). 
Weighting. To address the concern that our results may be driven by a few small districts, 
we weigh observations by the district-level, age-specific benefit caseload in a pre-policy period 
(1999Q3). Table A5 reports the results for equation (1) using this weighting system. Column (1) 
has a treatment coefficient for JSA outflows of 2.5%. Dynamic effects reported in column (2) are 
instead very similar to those of Table 3. For IB, the average effect reported in column (3) is lower 
than in the unweighted regression. The short and long run effects of the treatment are however 
very similar to those from the unweighted regression. 
Different age groups Table A6 
Estimates at Monthly Frequency. We are able to estimate JSA (but not IB) outflow 
equations at the monthly, rather than quarterly, frequency. The dependent variable is now the 
monthly outflow from JSA, having included the stock at the end of the previous month as a control. 
Column (1) in Table A7 shows a policy coefficient unemployment outflows of -1.6%, which is 
very close to the baseline -1.5%. The dynamic results in column (2) are also similar to the baseline. 
Heterogeneous Policy Effects. We investigated whether the treatment effects were 
heterogeneous in interesting ways across different groups. In particular we looked at whether the 
coefficients in columns (3) and (6) of Table 3 differed for welfare recipients of different ages, 
benefit durations, regions (e.g. London vs. others), and so on. We did not find evidence for much 
systematic heterogeneity across these groups. 
27 See Becker et al. (2010). Pilot areas were Bridgend, Gateshead, Somerset, East Lancashire, Essex, Derbyshire and 
Renfrewshire, Inverclyde, Argyll and Bute. The expansion occurred in three phases: phase 1 from October 2005 
(covering Tees Valley, Cumbria, Lancashire West and Glasgow), phase 2 from April 2006 (covering Barnsley, 
Doncaster & Rotherham, City of Sunderland, County Durham, Lanarkshire & East Dunbartonshire, Liverpool & 
Wirral, Greater Manchester Central and South West Wales; and phase 3 from October 2006 (covering Eastern Valleys, 
Greater Mersey and Staffordshire). 
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Alternative dynamic specifications. We explored alternative dynamic specifications in 
Table A4 which confirmed the robustness of our main specifications. Either put table later or 
text earlier 
7. Conclusions
The UK embarked on a major change in the administration of welfare benefits for the unemployed 
and the disabled in 2001 with the introduction of Jobcentre Plus. Bureaucratic incentives to help 
the disabled into jobs were sharpened, and offices were re-organised to be more efficient. At the 
same time, the growth of the stock of Incapacity Benefit recipients, which had been rising for 30 
years, stopped increasing. We evaluate this policy in the light of a framework with incentives, 
information and adjustment costs. We show that there are potentially two unintended consequences 
of the policy change. First, the relative incentives to help the unemployed into jobs fell. Second, 
the re-organization of the job centres temporarily reduced outflow rates from benefits, likely due 
to disruption effects.   
We found several results that are consistent with the existence of incentive and organization 
effects. First, we detect an increase in the outflow rates of both the groups of disabled and 
unemployed in the long-run, but the effects are much larger and only significant for the disabled. 
Second, there is evidence of important disruption effects, with outflow rates initially falling after 
the policy change for both groups. 
A dynamic cost-benefit analysis of the policy suggests that the short-run costs are easily 
outweighed by long-run benefits. However, the benefits of the program take time to be visible and 
this poses a problem for policy-makers whose time horizons may be much shorter than that of a 
social planner. This highlights the political economy problem at the heart of welfare reform: 
changes to the administration of the benefit system that have long-run benefits may have 
significant short-run costs, and this makes it hard to build up a coalition for change.  
There are many directions that the work could be taken. To what extent does the increased 
labour supply lead to lower equilibrium wages (not just due to compositional changes)? Can we 
unbundle further some of the elements of the policy to distinguish incentives effects from 
information (which conceivably could be more important for the disabled)? Could similar reforms 
be effective in other countries that have also seen large increases in the disability rolls? These are 
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areas that we are currently pursuing. 
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Figure 1: Number of disability Claimants (Incapacity Benefit) of working age: 1963 -2009 
Source: Beatty and Fothergill (2009). 
Figure 2: The Staggered Roll-out of the “Jobcentre Plus” Policy 
Notes: The vertical lines indicate the six waves of the roll-out of the policy (at the start of each wave at least one office 
switched to the new regime in a district). In Wave 1 there were 32 districts, in Wave 2 there were 27 districts, in Wave 
3 there were 36 districts, in Wave 4 there were 28 districts, in Wave 5 there were 135 districts and in Wave 6 there 
were 148 districts. The line shows the proportion of JSA claimants who were affected by the policy (i.e. each office 
is weighted by the stock of JSA claimants in the quarter that the policy was turned on. Source: Riley et al (2011) 
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Figure 3  
Spatial Map of Diffusion, by Wave 
 
 
Notes: The maps show the additional districts covered under each wave. The treated districts are shaded in black. The 
first wave begun on 1st October 2001. In Wave 1 there were 32 districts, in Wave 2 there were 27 districts, in Wave 
3 there were 36 districts, in Wave 4 there were 28 districts, in Wave 5 there were 135 districts and in Wave 6 there 
were 148 districts. By the first quarter of 2008, almost 100% of the country was covered. 
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 
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Figure 4 Panel A: Dynamic Effects on JSA Outflow 
Notes: The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. The outcome variable (on y-axis) is ln 
(outflow) for JSA. The solid middle line denotes the estimated coefficients for the dynamic specification in equation 
(2) based on column (3) of Table 3. “D_1” indicated the effect of the policy in the first quarter after the go live date; 
“D_2”, the second quarter and so on. “D_LR” is the long-run effect (after 8 quarters). The top and bottom lines 
denote the 95% confidence intervals.  
Figure 4 Panel B: Dynamic Effects on IB Outflow 
Notes: The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. The dependent variable is ln (outflow) for IB. 
The solid middle line denotes the estimated coefficients for the dynamic specification in equation (2) based on column 
(6) of Table 3. “D_1” indicated the effect of the policy in the first quarter after the go live date; “D_2”, the second 
quarter and so on. “D_LR” is the long-run effect (after 8 quarters).The top and bottom lines denote the 95% confidence 
intervals.  
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Figure 5: Dynamic Effects on JSA Outflows, with and without JSA inflow controls 
A: No controls for JSA Inflows 
B: Controlling for a fourth order distributed lag of JSA Inflows 
Notes: These are the coefficients in Table 6 column (2) and column (3). The dependent variable is ln (outflow) for 
JSA. The solid middle line denotes the estimated coefficients: “D_1” indicated the effect of the policy in the first 
quarter after the go live date; “D_2”, the second quarter and so on. “D_LR” is the long-run effect (after 8 quarters). 
The top and bottom dashed lines denote the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 6: Dynamic Effects on IB Outflows, with and without IB inflow controls 
Figure A: No controls for IB Inflows 
Figure B: Controlling for a fourth order distributed lag of IB Inflows 
Notes: These are the coefficients in Table 6 column (5) and column (6). The dependent variable is ln (outflow) for 
IB. The middle line denotes the estimated coefficients and the top and bottom dashed lines denote the 95% 
confidence intervals. “D_1” indicated the effect of the policy in the first quarter after the go live date; “D_2”, the 
second quarter and so on. “D_LR” is the long-run effect (after 8 quarters). 
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Figure 7: Cost-benefit analysis of Jobcentre Plus: Dynamic evaluation 
Notes: We consider an immediate roll-out of the policy. The solid horizontal line represents set-up costs of the policy. The 
dashed lines represent the cumulative benefit of the policy each in each quarter (increase in wage bill, lower deadweight costs 
of taxation and lower administrative running costs). See text for details. 
Figure 8: Comparing Dynamic Effects on IB, JSA and LP Outflow 
Notes: The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. The dependent variable is ln (outflow) for IB for 
the top line. The middle line represents ln (outflow) for LP and the bottom line for JSA. The three lines denote the 
estimated coefficients for the dynamic specification in equation (2), plotted together for comparison across the three. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Quarterly Aggregate 
Unweighted average across all 
 district-age-quarter cells 
Mean SD Mean SD Obs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
JSA Outflow 653,819 78,049 805 860 29,232 
JSA Stock (t-1) 939,267 115,578 1,156 1,650 29,232 
JSA Outflow rate  
(outflow(t)/stock(t-1)) 0.698 0.057 0.871 0.266 29,232 
JSA Inflow 648,957 58,156 799 843 29,232 
JSA Outflow to Work 288,037 61,225 353 384 29,343 
IB Outflow 56,166 11,267 70 106 29,232 
IB Stock (t-1) 2,045,210 356,417 2,567 4,259 29,232 
IB Outflow rate  
(outflow(t)/stock(t-1)) 0.028 0.0027 0.048 0.043 29,232 
IB Inflow 148,318 12,125 181 241 29,232 
Notes: These are descriptive statistics across all districts in our sample for the UK over the period 1999Q3- 
2008Q2. The first two columns aggregate stocks and flows to the year-quarter level and then average over the 36 
quarters in our sample. The last 3 columns present the unweighted average of the district-age-quarter unit of 
observations used in our analysis. JSA= Job Seekers Allowance (unemployment insurance in the UK); IB=Incapacity 
Benefit, main form of disability benefit in UK. 
Table 2: Policy Effects on outflow from unemployment (JSA) and disability (IB) benefits 
Ln(Total Outflow) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Benefit: JSA JSA JSA IB IB IB 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0153*** -0.0152*** -0.0152*** 0.0166* 0.0158* 0.0151* 
(0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0089) (0.0087) (0.0087) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.7249*** 0.6355*** 0.6323*** 0.2495*** 0.1462*** 0.3475*** 
(0.0095) (0.0085) (0.0100) (0.0290) (0.0195) (0.0314) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 -0.0820*** 0.0072 0.0105 0.1705*** 0.2251*** 0.0502* 
(0.0102) (0.0086) (0.0097) (0.0246) (0.0196) (0.0256) 
Observations 29,168 29,168 29,168 26,450 26,450 26,450 
District*Age FE NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Age*Time FE NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Notes: Each column estimates equation (1) with the dependent variable as the log of the outflow from benefit during a year-
quarter. All regressions control for district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 
2008Q2 and two age groups (18-25 and 26-60). In columns 1, 2 and 3, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for JSA. In columns 
4, 5 and 6, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for IB. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. “Post” is a dummy 
equal to 1 in the post policy period and zero otherwise. 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group 
(and 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Effects of policy allowing for dynamics 
Dependent Variable: ln(Total Outflow) 
Quarters after (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Policy intro JSA JSA JSA IB IB IB 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏   -0.0234*** -0.0229*** -0.0230*** -0.0203* -0.0154 -0.0162 
(0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0117) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0230*** -0.0230*** -0.0230*** 0.0052 0.0047 0.0044 
(0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0249*** -0.0249*** -0.0249*** 0.0112 0.0115 0.0101 
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0139) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0208*** -0.0208*** -0.0208*** 0.0254* 0.0223* 0.0220* 
(0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0131) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0166** -0.0166** -0.0166** 0.0044 0.0045 0.0044 
(0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0143) (0.0139) (0.0139) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0066 -0.0067 -0.0067 0.0370** 0.0309** 0.0298** 
(0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0144) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0077 -0.0076 -0.0076 0.0430*** 0.0415*** 0.0403*** 
(0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0149) 
𝑫𝑫𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 0.0117 0.0117 0.0117 0.0646*** 0.0622*** 0.0612*** 
(0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0150) (0.0144) (0.0145) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.7237*** 0.6344*** 0.6312*** 0.2589*** 0.1552*** 0.3572*** 
(0.0095) (0.0084) (0.0100) (0.0288) (0.0189) (0.0308) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 -0.0832*** 0.0060 0.0092 0.1808*** 0.2351*** 0.0595** 
(0.0101) (0.0085) (0.0096) (0.0239) (0.0191) (0.0255) 
Observations 29,168 29,168 29,168 26,450 26,450 26,450 
District*Age FE NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Age*Time FE NO NO YES NO NO YES 
F Test 4.5560 4.4980 4.4920 4.6310 4.3260 4.2410 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
Notes: Dij indicates the treatment effect each quarter j after the policy is introduced. Each column estimates equation (2) with the 
dependent variable as the log of the outflow from benefit during a year-quarter. All regressions control for district, time and age 
fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. In columns 1, 2 and 3, the dependent variable is ln 
(outflow) for JSA. In columns 4, 5 and 6, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for IB. The last row contains the p-value of the F 
test for the joint significance of the post-treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 is the lagged 
stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate 
dummy for each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Pre-treatment Trends in Benefit Outflow? 
ln(Total Outflow) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
JSA JSA IB IB 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝒊𝒊  0.0013 0.0162 
(0.0065) (0.0109) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝒊𝒊  0.0039 -0.0135 
(0.0063) (0.0114) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝒊𝒊  -0.0021 0.0053 
(0.0068) (0.0119) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 -0.0134* -0.0010 
(0.0079) (0.0123) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0152*** -0.0168** 0.0151* 0.0160 
(0.0055) (0.0069) (0.0087) (0.0100) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.6323*** 0.6323*** 0.3475*** 0.3473*** 
(0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0314) (0.0314) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.0105 0.0105 0.0502* 0.0502* 
(0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0256) (0.0256) 
Observations 29,168 29,168 26,450 26,450 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES 
F Test 1.8830 1.3560 
p-value 0.1130 0.2480 
Notes: D indicates the treatment effect each quarter before the policy is introduced. Each column estimates equation (3) with 
the dependent variable as the log of the outflow from benefit during a year-quarter. All regressions control for district, time 
and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent 
variable is ln (outflow) for JSA. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for IB. The last row contains the 
p-value of the F test for the joint significance of the pre-treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 the same for the other age groups). 
Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Analysis of Benefit Inflows 
Ln(Total Inflow) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
JSA JSA IB IB 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0063 -0.0054 
(0.0085) (0.0072) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏   -0.0155* -0.0175** 
(0.0081) (0.0080) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0327*** -0.0179* 
(0.0081) (0.0094) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0170** -0.0068 
(0.0086) (0.0088) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0267*** -0.0064 
(0.0086) (0.0093) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 0.0164 0.0043 
(0.0129) (0.0094) 
Ln(population) 0.1441 0.1340 -0.0072 -0.0134 
(0.1278) (0.1254) (0.0610) (0.0609) 
Observations 29,096 29,096 26,727 26,727 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: All columns estimate equation (4) with the dependent variable as the inflow into benefits during a year-quarter. 
All regressions control for district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 
2008Q2. In columns 1-4, the dependent variable is ln (inflow). Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Dynamic Policy Effects on JSA and IB Outflows controlling for inflows 
Ln(Total Outflow) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
JSA JSA JSA IB IB IB 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏   -0.0235*** -0.0267*** -0.0254*** -0.0156 -0.0174 -0.0191 
(0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0061) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0119) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0149*** -0.0176*** -0.0256*** 0.006 0.0048 0.0014 
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0068) (0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0145*** -0.0178*** -0.0278*** 0.0089 0.0074 0.0039 
(0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0064) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0139) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0131*** -0.0119** -0.0237*** 0.0291** 0.0283** 0.0255* 
(0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0062) (0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0134) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0073 -0.006 -0.0196*** 0.0075 0.0062 0.0036 
(0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0141) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0021 0.0022 -0.0098 0.0334** 0.0312** 0.0293** 
(0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0066) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0140) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0123 0.0401*** 0.0362** 0.0363** 
(0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0099) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0152) 
𝑫𝑫𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 0.0064 0.0028 0.0062 0.0589*** 0.0503*** 0.0547*** 
(0.0068) (0.0057) (0.0103) (0.0144) (0.0141) (0.0145) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(𝑰𝑰𝒍𝒍𝑰𝑰𝒍𝒍𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰)𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.4252*** 0.3765*** (0.0244) (0.0286) (0.0285) 
(0.0200) (0.0147) 0.0863*** 0.0764*** 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(𝑰𝑰𝒍𝒍𝑰𝑰𝒍𝒍𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰)𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝒊𝒊  0.0773*** (0.0133) (0.0132) 
(0.0109) 0.0544*** 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(𝑰𝑰𝒍𝒍𝑰𝑰𝒍𝒍𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰)𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝒊𝒊  0.0457*** (0.0130) 
(0.0137) 0.0344*** 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(𝑰𝑰𝒍𝒍𝑰𝑰𝒍𝒍𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰)𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝒊𝒊  0.0827*** (0.0119) 
(0.0108) 0.0359*** 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.3679*** 0.3323*** 0.6350*** (0.0121) 
(0.0149) (0.0117) (0.0105) 0.3312*** 0.2775*** 0.3761*** 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.0069 -0.0109* 0.0033 (0.0307) (0.0344) (0.0328) 
(0.0069) (0.0059) (0.0092) 0.0493** 0.0231 0.0346 
Observations 28352 25915 25915 24402 22304 22304 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: All columns estimate equation (2) with the dependent variable as the outflow from benefits during a year-quarter. All 
regressions control for district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. In columns 
1-3, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for JSA and the dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the ln (outflow) for IB. Standard errors 
are clustered at the district level. 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 the same for 
the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Dynamic Effects on the Outflow to Work 
Ln(Outflow by destination) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
To Work To work Not to work Not to work 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0244*** -0.0169*** 
(0.0065) (0.0065) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏   -0.0320*** -0.0402*** 
(0.0074) (0.0118) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0163** -0.0386*** 
(0.0078) (0.0125) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0375*** -0.0355*** 
(0.0090) (0.0120) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0218** -0.0403*** 
(0.0090) (0.0119) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0351*** -0.0253** 
(0.0107) (0.0125) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0139 -0.0238* 
(0.0095) (0.0130) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0187* -0.0122 
(0.0107) (0.0154) 
𝑫𝑫𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 -0.0082 0.0084 
(0.0107) (0.0145) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.6213*** 0.6262*** 0.6305*** 0.5488*** 
(0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0121) (0.0215) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 -0.0313** -0.0278** 0.0240** 0.0319* 
(0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0110) (0.0193) 
Observations 28,019 28,019 28,075 28,075 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Column 1 estimates equation (1) and column 2 estimates equation (2), both with the dependent variable as the 
log of the outflow from benefit to work during a year-quarter. All regressions control for district, time and age fixed 
effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. In columns 1, 2 and 3, the dependent variable 
is log (outflow to work) for JSA. The last row contains the p-value of the F test for the joint significance of the post-
treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 is the lagged stock of individuals on 
benefits in the same age group (and 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for 
each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Cost-benefit analysis: Steady-state evaluation 
Re-employment earnings 
(1) 
Lower bound 
(min wage) 
(2) 
Mean re-
employment 
earnings 
(3) 
Upper Bound 
(median wage) 
1. Administration cost in old regime (2000 prices) (£m) 3552 3552 3552 
2. Administration cost in new regime (2000 prices) (£m) 3314 3314 3314 
3. Annual saving in administrative costs (£m) 238 238 238 
4. Weekly earnings 122.00 250.0 360.0 
5. Increase in GDP from wage income (£m) 472.11 967.44 1393.11 
6. Deadweight gain (£m) 113.68 204.34 121.79 
(40% net exchequer saving)
7. Annual social benefit (2000 prices) (£m) 823.79 1409.77 1752.90 
8. Annual social benefit (2010 prices) (£m) 1013.14 1733.82 2155.82 
9. PDV of social benefit (£m) 28946.93 49537.77 61594.92 
10. Total JCPlus Setup Cost (2010 prices) (£m) 2259.61 2259.61 2259.61 
11. Net benefit (£m) 26687.32 47278.15 59335.31 
Notes: We assume that the policy in introduced nationally and we immediately jump to the steady state effects (i.e. we ignore 
transitional dynamics). The administrative costs are from NAO (2008) and the benefits based on our econometric analysis discussed 
in the text.  
Table 9: Treatment effect in individual waves 
WAVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 Baseline 
Panel A: Ln(Total Outflow) from JSA 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0196 -0.0162* -0.0147* -0.0121 -0.0103 -0.0107* -0.0152*** 
(0.0135) (0.0093) (0.0078) (0.0080) (0.0073) (0.0062) (0.0055) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.3253*** 0.3407*** 0.3602*** 0.3835*** 0.3916*** 0.3949*** 0.6323*** 
(0.0182) (0.0188) (0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0149) (0.0100) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.3373*** 0.2825*** 0.2594*** 0.2272*** 0.2248*** 0.2219*** 0.0105 
(0.0195) (0.0187) (0.0180) (0.0210) (0.0224) (0.0226) (0.0097) 
Observations 9727 12967 16207 19448 22688 25928 29168 
Panel B: Ln(Total Outflow) from IB 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 0.0114 0.0319 0.0315** 0.0295** 0.0254** 0.0171* 0.0151* 
(0.0279) (0.0202) (0.0159) (0.0124) (0.0108) (0.0096) (0.0087) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.2221*** 0.1511*** 0.1800*** 0.1624*** 0.1534*** 0.1626*** 0.3475*** 
(0.0493) (0.0407) (0.0355) (0.0320) (0.0308) (0.0284) (0.0314) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 1.1741*** 0.7325*** 0.3921*** 0.4031*** 0.4081*** 0.3202*** 0.0502* 
(0.2219) -0.1647 (0.1307) (0.1118) (0.0980) (0.0836) (0.0256) 
Observations 7635 10435 13256 16070 18844 21637 26450 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the quarterly outflow from benefit. All regressions control for interacted district-age and 
interacted age-time fixed effects. The regressions restrict the post-treatment period to 4 quarters after each wave. The sample is a panel 
of 406 districts for each wave. In the upper panel the dependent variable is ln(outflow) for JSA. In the lower panel, the dependent 
variable is the ln(outflow) from IB. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits 
in the same age group (and 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 10: Treatment Effect on Lone Parents
Ln(Total Outflow) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LP LP LP LP LP 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝒊𝒊   -0.0120 0.0014 
(0.0112) (0.0111) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝒊𝒊   -0.0302*** -0.0166 
(0.0103) (0.0106) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝒊𝒊   -0.0140 -0.0003 
(0.0119) (0.0117) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 -0.0401*** -0.0255** 
(0.0119) (0.0121) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0131* -0.0270*** -0.0159* -0.0096 
(0.0067) (0.0087) (0.0095) (0.0073) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏   -0.0265** 
(0.0110) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0067 
(0.0116) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0016 
(0.0107) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0020 
(0.0118) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0166 
(0.0131) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 0.0083 
(0.0115) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 0.0211 
(0.0143) 
𝑫𝑫𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 0.0247** 
(0.0122) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.4819*** 0.4845*** 0.5529*** 0.5523*** 0.5535*** 
(0.0634) (0.0632) (0.0895) (0.0895) (0.0898) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 -0.1921*** -0.1907*** -0.1304* -0.1307* -0.1302 
(0.0553) (0.0550) (0.0790) (0.0790) (0.0793) 
Observations 26,378 26,378 26,378 26,378 26,378 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES YES 
District Trend NO NO YES YES YES 
F-Test 3.894 1.757 2.137 
P-value 0.00408 0.137 0.0389 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the quarterly outflow from benefit. All regressions control for district, 
time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. The dependent variable is 
ln (outflow) for LP. The last row contains the p-value of the F test for the joint significance of the pre-treatment 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the 
same age group (and 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter 
by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11: Spillover effects of the policy into neighbouring districts 
Ln(Total Outflows) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
JSA JSA IB IB 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0113 -0.0123* 0.0323*** 0.0311*** 
(0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0106) (0.0106) 
𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊  0.0150 0.0146 
(0.0092) (0.0126) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.6262*** 0.6242*** 0.3514*** 0.3522*** 
(0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0383) (0.0383) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.0099 0.0079 0.0673** 0.0683** 
(0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0297) (0.0297) 
Observations 22,688 22,688 20,374 20,374 
Notes: Each column estimates equation (5) with the dependent variable as the log of the quarterly outflow from benefit. 
All regressions control for district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 
2006Q2. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for JSA. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable 
is ln (outflow) for IB. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 is the lagged stock of individuals on 
benefits in the same age group (and 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for 
each quarter by year pair.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendices: Not intended for publication unless requested 
A. Appendix Tables and Figures 
Figure A1: Dynamic Effects on JSA Outflow to Work 
Notes: The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. The dependent variable is ln (outflow to 
work) for JSA. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The middle line denotes the estimated coefficients 
for the dynamic specification in Table 7 Column (2). The top and bottom lines denote the 95% confidence intervals. 
Table A1: Job Entry Target points (2002-03) 
Client Group Points Awarded 
Disabled People and inactive benefits (IB) 12 
Lone Parents (LP) 12 
New Deal 50+, 25+, Young People 8 
Other long term JSA 8 
Short term unemployed JSA 4 
Employed job-entries 1 
Area-based points 1 
Notes: The second column lists the number of points awarded to a benefit officer for placing a claimant from the 
corresponding benefit category in column (1) into jobs. 
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Table A2: Policy Effects on the JSA and IB Outflows from Offices 
Ln(Total Outflow) 
(1) (2) 
JSA JSA 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝒊𝒊  -0.0025 
(0.0070) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝒊𝒊  -0.0134* 
(0.0079) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝒊𝒊  -0.0182** 
(0.0086) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 -0.0550*** 
(0.0099) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0545*** -0.0710*** 
(0.0056) (0.0117) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.7410*** 0.7413*** 
(0.0144) (0.0155) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.1418*** 0.1421*** 
(0.0167) (0.0227) 
Observations 48,351 48,351 
District*Age FE YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES 
F Test 17.8300 
p-value 0.0000 
Notes: The above table is limited to the JSA due to data availability. The first column estimates equation (1) and 
column (2) estimates equation (3) with the dependent variable as the log of the outflow at the office level from 
JSA during a year-quarter. All regressions control for district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel 
of 695 offices districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. The last row contains the p-value of the F test for the joint 
significance of the pre-treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 is the lagged 
stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 the same for the other age groups). Time 
effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
41 
Table A3: Treatment effect in Individual waves (dropping previous waves) 
WAVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 Stacked 
Panel A: Ln(Total Outflow) from JSA 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0196 -0.0314 -0.024 -0.0234 -0.0373 -0.0323 -0.0333 
(0.0135) (0.0200) (0.0129) (0.0183) (0.0129) (0.0185) (0.0073) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.3253 0.341 0.3688 0.388 0.3924 0.387 0.3816 
(0.0182) (0.0199) (0.0160) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0159) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.3373 0.2838 0.2582 0.2219 0.2127 0.205 0.2182 
(0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0174) (0.0188) (0.0194) (0.0202) (0.0181) 
Observations 9727 11943 13848 14889 15801 15817 20216 
Panel B: Ln(Total Outflow) from IB 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 0.0114 -0.0336 -0.0015 -0.0073 -0.0052 -0.0288 -0.0118 
(0.0279) (0.0376) (0.0245) (0.0202) (0.0228) (0.0213) (0.0137) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.2221 0.1464 0.1601 0.1575 0.132 0.1214 0.1593 
(0.0493) (0.0419) (0.0384) (0.0361) (0.0364) (0.0354) (0.0331) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 1.1741 0.5537 0.356 0.4087 0.4283 0.4151 0.3894 
(0.2219) (0.1658) (0.1341) (0.1219) (0.1203) (0.1072) (0.1055) 
Observations 7635 9556 11209 12016 12594 12331 16533 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the quarterly outflow from benefit. All regressions control for interacted 
district-age and interacted age-time fixed effects. The regressions restrict the post-treatment period to 4 quarters after 
each wave and drop districts treated in previous waves. In the upper panel the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for 
JSA. In the lower panel, the dependent variable is the ln (outflow) from IB. Standard errors are clustered at the district 
level. 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 the same for the other age 
groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
42 
Table A4: Specification test for dynamic structure
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the quarterly outflow from benefit. All regressions control for district, time and age 
fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. In columns 1, 2 and 3, the dependent variable is ln 
(outflow) for JSA. In columns 4, 5 and 6, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for IB. The last row contains the p-value of the 
F test for the joint significance of the post-treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Ln(Total Outflow from Benefit) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
JSA JSA JSA IB IB IB 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏  -0.0274*** -0.0260*** -0.0238*** -0.0209* -0.0190* -0.0144 
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0115) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0282*** -0.0265*** -0.0240*** -0.0041 -0.0019 0.0033 
(0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0308*** -0.0289*** -0.0261*** -0.0027 -0.0002 0.0058 
(0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0133) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0255*** -0.0222*** 0.0079 0.0147 
(0.0065) (0.0063) (0.0121) (0.0123) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0182*** 0.0011 
(0.0068) (0.0138) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0085 0.0286** 
(0.0065) (0.0134) 
𝑫𝑫4𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 -0.0044 0.0353*** 
(0.0066) (0.0105) 
𝑫𝑫5𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 0.0001 0.0413*** 
(0.0073) (0.0113) 
𝑫𝑫7𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 0.0078 0.0576*** 
(0.0089) (0.0127) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.6474*** 0.6473*** 0.6469*** 0.1511*** 0.1521*** 0.1547*** 
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0177) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0019 0.2198*** 0.2209*** 0.2239*** 
(0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0183) 
Observations 30,788 30,788 30,788 28,074 28,074 28,074 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 
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Table A5: Robustness to Weighting by District Level Benefit Caseload
Ln(Total Outflow from Benefit) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
JSA JSA IB IB 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0251*** 0.0091 
(0.0060) (0.0088) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏  -0.0288*** -0.0074 
(0.0077) (0.0089) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0317*** 0.0029 
(0.0079) (0.0116) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0340*** -0.0096 
(0.0080) (0.0107) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0280*** 0.0188 
(0.0067) (0.0132) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0283*** -0.0100 
(0.0065) (0.0128) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0203*** 0.0316** 
(0.0067) (0.0140) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0243** 0.0240 
(0.0095) (0.0167) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 0.0031 0.0592*** 
(0.0087) (0.0148) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.5940*** 0.5898*** 0.4055*** 0.3950*** 
(0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0522) (0.0502) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.0560*** 0.0561*** 0.0106 0.0384 
(0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0265) (0.0239) 
Observations 29,159 29,159 26,450 26,450 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES 
P-value 0.0002 0.0000 
Notes: Columns 1&3 estimate equation (1) and columns 2&4 estimate equation (2), both with the dependent variable as the log 
of the quarterly outflow from benefit. All regressions are weighted by the particular benefit caseload in the district-age group 
in 1999Q3 (prior to treatment). All estimations control for district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 
districts from 1999Q3 to 2007Q4. In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for JSA. In columns 3 and 4, the 
dependent variable is ln (outflow) for IB. The last row contains the p-value of the F test for the joint significance of the post-
treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in 
the same age group (and 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year 
pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A6: Robustness to Different Age Groups (18-54 year olds instead of 18-59)
Ln(Total Outflow from Benefit) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
JSA JSA IB IB 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0155*** 0.0143* 
(0.0056) (0.0087) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏  -0.0223*** -0.0109 
(0.0062) (0.0118) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0241*** 0.0081 
(0.0070) (0.0119) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0265*** 0.0068 
(0.0064) (0.0134) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0210*** 0.0177 
(0.0062) (0.0125) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0166** 0.0044 
(0.0070) (0.0140) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0069 0.0276* 
(0.0067) (0.0141) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0078 0.0434*** 
(0.0100) (0.0155) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 0.0123 0.0515*** 
(0.0106) (0.0176) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.6303*** 0.6291*** 0.3474*** 0.3554*** 
(0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0314) (0.0309) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.0112 0.0099 0.0502* 0.0581** 
(0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0256) (0.0256) 
Observations 29,159 29,159 26,450 26,450 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES 
P-value 0.0000 0.0094 
Notes: Columns 1&3 estimate equation (1) and columns 2&4 estimate equation (2), both with the dependent variable as the log 
of the quarterly outflow from benefit. The age groups considered in these regressions are young (18-24) and old (25-54) as 
opposed to the definition of the older group as 25-59 year olds in all previous tables. All estimations control for district, time 
and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2007Q4. In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable 
is ln (outflow) for JSA. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for IB. The last row contains the p-value of 
the F test for the joint significance of the post-treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 is 
the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 the same for the other age groups). Time effects 
are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7: Treatment effects on Monthly Outflows from JSA 
Ln(Total Outflow) 
(1) (2) 
JSA JSA 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0162*** 
(0.0056) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏  -0.0251*** 
(0.0067) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0205*** 
(0.0072) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0215*** 
(0.0068) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0187*** 
(0.0063) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0217*** 
(0.0076) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0064 
(0.0070) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 -0.0061 
(0.0088) 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 0.0067 
(0.0097) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 0.7099*** 0.7090*** 
(0.0108) (0.0109) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝑼𝑼𝒂𝒂′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝟏𝟏 -0.0620*** -0.0629*** 
(0.0103) (0.0102) 
Observations 84,202 84,202 
District*Age FE YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES 
Notes: Column 1 estimates equation (1) and column 2 estimates equation (2), both with the dependent variable as 
the log of the outflow from benefit during a year-month. All regressions control for district, time and age fixed 
effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from January 1999 to December 2008. The dependent variable is ln 
(outflow) for JSA. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 is the lagged stock of individuals on 
benefits in the same age group (and 𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎′𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−1 the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy 
for each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A: Data Description 
The empirics are based on three primary sources of data. First, the design of the policy and the list 
of districts covered under each wave of the rollout was provided by the Department of Work and 
Pensions. Second, data on other welfare benefits including the key disability benefit, Incapacity 
Benefit (IB) was sourced directly from the Department of Work and Pensions Tabulation Tool – 
www.tabulation-tool.dwp.gov.uk/WorkProg/tabtool.html. This provides only quarterly data on the 
stocks, inflows and outflows of benefit recipients. The data is available for Great Britain (i.e. 
including England, Wales and Scotland) at the Local Authority Districts level from 1999 Q3 
onwards only. The 4 quarters in the dataset are defined as February-April, May-July, August-
October and November-January. The data can be disaggregated by age and duration. 
The second dataset, the Job Seeker’s Allowance database was downloaded from 
www.nomisweb.co.uk. It provides monthly information from 1983 on the stocks, inflows and 
outflows of recipients’ unemployment benefits. The data is available at various geographical 
levels. We use the data at the Local Authority Districts across Great Britain and there are 406 
districts defined on a consistent basis. The data can be disaggregated by age, duration as well as 
both.  
To be consistent across the two datasets, the monthly JSA information is aggregated to the 
quarterly level. The quarters are defined as February-April, May-July, August-October and 
November-January. In order to create a quarterly dataset using the monthly information, the flows 
of each month in a quarter were added up to get the total flows in a quarter. The stocks at the end 
of a quarter are measured as the stock in the last month of the quarter.  
In addition, we use the quarterly micro individual-level panel of the UK Labour Force 
Survey from 1998 to 2008 to get estimates on the household composition of benefit claimants, 
mean wages, origins of benefit inflows and destination of benefit leavers. The data is securely 
provided by the UK Data Service under Special Access License. The quartiles of the weekly 
earnings distribution were taken from the 2000 New Earnings Survey. 
We used digitized boundary datasets and geographic look-up tables corresponding to the 
census geography of Great Britain, provided by the UK Data Service. We used the boundary data 
in ArcGIS to illustrate the policy rollout and to define the neighbours of districts. 
Finally, the IFS had generously provided benefits estimates using the IFS tax and benefit 
micro-simulation model, TAXBEN. In order to estimate the net exchequer cost of benefit 
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claimants, their estimates assumed that the house rent is £44 per week (the average among families 
receiving income support, jobseeker's allowance or incapacity benefit) and that all disposable 
income is spent on items subject to the standard rate of VAT and no excise duties. 
Appendix B 
B1. Steady-state change in the IB rate for the Cost-benefit analysis 
In the cost-benefit analysis we have to consider translating our estimates of flow changes into 
changes in unemployment and welfare stocks. We obtain the steady state change in the IB rate, 
based on permanent changes in the IB outflow rate following the introduction of Jobcentre Plus.  
Assume there are only two states, employment and IB, and denote by s the inflow rate from 
employment into IB, and by f the outflow rate from IB into employment. In steady state the IB rate 
is constant, and flow equilibrium implies that the IB rate (as a fraction of the total population) is 
given by:  
𝑢𝑢 = 𝑠𝑠
𝑠𝑠 + 𝑓𝑓
The policy has an impact on f, leaving s unaffected. The resulting change in the (log) IB rate is 
given by  
𝑑𝑑 ln𝑢𝑢 = −(1 − 𝑢𝑢)𝑑𝑑 ln𝑓𝑓. 
The implied change in the number of jobs in steady state is given by: 
∆𝑒𝑒 = −𝑢𝑢 𝑑𝑑 ln𝑢𝑢 = 𝑢𝑢(1 − 𝑢𝑢)𝑑𝑑 ln 𝑓𝑓     (B1) 
According to our estimates, 𝑑𝑑 ln 𝑓𝑓 = 𝛽𝛽 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑑𝑑 ln𝑢𝑢, where 𝛽𝛽 is the treatment effect estimated 
by diffs-in-diff, and 𝛼𝛼 is the coefficient on the log IB stock. The terms in 𝑢𝑢 on the right-hand side 
of (B1) are evaluated using the actual IB rate in the pre-policy period. 
B2. Off steady-state approximation 
At each point in time the unemployment rate evolves according to 
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𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎 .  (B2) 
Solving (B2) forward one period gives: 
𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎 = 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎∗ + (1 − 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎)𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎−1,  (B3) 
where 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎∗ denotes steady state unemployment and 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎 denotes the rate of convergence to it: 
𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎 = 1 − exp(𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎). 
Using a log-linear approximation to (B3) it can be shown that: 
𝑑𝑑 ln𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎 = − 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎−1(1 − 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎−1∗ )𝑑𝑑 ln 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎, 
where, as above, 𝑑𝑑 ln 𝑓𝑓 = 𝛽𝛽 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑑𝑑 ln𝑢𝑢, 𝑢𝑢 is evaluated using the actual IB rate in the previous 
quarter and 𝑢𝑢∗ is evaluated using the (constant) pre-policy inflow rate into benefits obtained from 
the Labour Force Survey and  the time varying outflow rate from benefits as obtained from our 
estimates.  
While the steady-state result stated above is only used for IB predictions (as the steady-
state impact of policy on the JSA outflow is close to zero), the off-steady state results are used to 
obtain predictions for both the IB and JSA rate during the transition to a new steady state.  
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